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第一篇：英文演讲稿
no writer who knows the great writers who did not receive the prize can accept it other than with humility. there is no need to list these writers. everyone here may make his own list according to his knowledge and his conscience.
没有一个作家，当他知道在他以前不少伟大的作家并没有获得此项奖金的时候，能够心安理得地领奖而不感到受之有愧。这里无须一一列举这些作家的名字。在座的每一个人，都可以根据他的学识和良心提出自己名单来。 it would be impossible for me to ask the ambassador of my country to read a speech in which a writer saidall of the things which are in his heart. things may not be immediately discernible in what a man writes, and in this sometimes he is fortunate; but eventually they are quite clear and by these and the degree of alchemy that he possesses he will endure or be forgotten.
要求我国的大使在这儿宣读一篇演说，把一个作家心中所有感受说出来那是不可能的'。一个人作品中的一些东西可能不会马上被人理解，在这点上，他有时是幸运的;但是这一切终究会十分清晰起来，通过它们以及作家所具有的点石成金的本领之大小，他将青史留名或被人遗忘。
writing at its best is a lonely life. organizations for writers palliate the writer's loneliness, but i doubt if they improve his writing. he grows in public stature as he sheds his loneliness and often his work deteriorates. for he does his work alone, and if he is a good enough writer, he must face eternity or the lack of it each day.
很多时候，写作是一种孤寂的生活。作家组织固然可以排遣他们的孤独，但是我怀疑它们是否能够促进作家的创作。一个在稠人广众之中成长起来的作家，自然可以免除孤苦寂寥之虑，但他的作品往往流于平庸。而一个在孤寂中工作的作家，如果他又确实不同凡响，那他就必须面对永恒或者面对缺乏永恒的每一天。
for a true writer, each book should be a new beginning where he tries again for something that is beyond attainment. he should always try for something that has never been done or that others have tried and failed. then sometimes, with good luck, he will succeed.
对于一个真正的作家来说，每一本书都应该成为他继续探索那些尚未涉及的领域的一个新起点。他应该永远尝试去做那些从来没有人做过或者他人做过但却已经失败的事。这样他就会有幸获得成功。
how simple the writing of literature would be if it were only necessary to write in another way what has been well written. it is because we have had such great writers in the past that a writer is driven far out past where he can go, out to where no one can help him.
如果仅仅是将已经写好的作品换一种方式来重新诠释，那么文学创作就显得太轻而易举了。我们的前辈大师们留下了伟大的业绩，正因为如此，一个普通作家常被他们逼人的光辉驱赶到远离他可能到达的地方，陷于孤立无援的境地。
i have spoken too long for a writer. a writer should write what he has to say and not speak it.
作为一个作家，我讲的已经太多了。作家应当把自己要说的话写下来，而不是说出来。
again i thank you.
再一次谢谢大家。
第二篇：英语演讲稿
you practiced over and over again; you e optimistic and expect the best to happen. it is certainly a state of mind that is well worth developing and strengthening.
so next time, you will practice just as much, still want it just as much, will study just as hard. what will be different is that you will also put on a smile. a positive attitude might just be the one thing that you need to succeed!
good afternoon, my dear friends.
i am very happy to meet you here.it is my great honor to communicate prehensive abilities.if e an outstanding man. but there are some students still pletely forget their task as college students.
finally, i hope everybody can try their best to become a worthy person to our country, and make great contributions to the society!
第三篇：最新英文演讲稿
Youth is not a time of life; it is a state of mind; it is not a matter of rosy cheeks， red lips and supple knees; it is a matter of the will， a quality of the imagination， a vigor of the emotions; it is the freshness of the deep springs of life.Youth means a temperamental predominance of courage over timidity， of the appetite for adventure over the love of ease. This often exists in a man of 60 more than a boy of 20. Nobody grows old merely by a number of years. We grow old by deserting our ideals.
Years may wrinkle the skin， but to give up enthusiasm wrinkles the soul. Worry， fear， self-distrust bows the heart and turns the spring back to dust.
Whether 60 or 16， there is in every human being's heart the lure of wonder， the unfailing childlike appetite of what's next and the joy of the game of living. In the center of your heart and my heart there is a wireless station: so long as it receives messages of beauty， hope， cheer， courage and power from men and from the Infinite， so long are you young.
When the aerials are down， and your spirit is covered with snows of cynicism and the ice of pessimism， then you are grown old， even at 20， but as long as your aerials are up， to catch waves of optimism， there is hope you may die young at 80.相关文档推荐查看无忧考网英语资源全部文档资源 >>
第四篇：英语演讲稿
I have a dream that one day every vally shall be exalted, every hill and mountain shall be made low, the rough places will be made plain, and the crooked places will be made straight, and the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together.
Wow, what a dream it has been for Martin Luther King. But the changing world seems telling me that people gradually get their dreams lost somehow in the process of growing up, and sometimes I personally find myself saying goodbye unconsciously to those distant childhood dreams.
However, we meed dreams. They nourish our spirit; they represent possibility even when we are dragged down by reality. They keep us going. Most successful people are dreamers as well as ordinary people who are not afraid to think big and dare to be great. When we were little kids, we all dreamed of doing something big and splashy, something significant. Now what we need to do is to maintain them, refresh them and turn them into reality. However, the toughest part is that we often have no ideas how to translate these dreams into actions. Well, just start with concrete objectives and stick to it. Don’t let the nameless fear confuse the eye and confound our strong belief of future. Through our talents, through our wits, through our endurance and through our creativity, we will make it.
Hold fast to dreams, for if dreams die, life is a broken-winged bird that cannot fly. Hold fast to dreams, for when dreams go, life is a barren field frozen with snow. So my dear friends, think of your old and maybe dead dreams. Whatever it is, pick it up and make it alive from today.
第五篇：英语演讲稿
Good Evening, my fellow Americans.
Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world, the war in Vietnam.
I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.
Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.
How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?
How has this administration changed the policy of the previous Administration?
What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and the battlefront in Vietnam?
What choices do we have if we are to end the war?
What are the prospects for peace?
Now let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on Jan. 20th: The war had been going on for four years. Thirty-one thousand Americans had been killed in action. The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule. Five hundred forty-thousand Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number. No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.
The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friend, as well as our enemies, abroad.
In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged withdrawal of all American forces. From a political standpoint, this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him -- and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: this was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson’s war to become Nixon’s war.
But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my Administration, and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, and on the future of peace and freedom in America, and in the world.
Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson’s war becomes Nixon’s war. The great question is: How can we win America’s peace?
Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue: why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet union , launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.
In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts of prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.
Now many believe that President Johnson’s decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others, I among them, have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.
But the question facing us today is -- now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?
In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.
For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before. They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.
We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.
With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities at Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation and particularly for the million-and-a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.
For the United States this first defeat in our nation’s history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership not only in Asia but throughout the world.
Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.
In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic eloquence and clarity said we want to see a stable Government there, carrying on the struggle to maintain its national independence.
We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but Southeast Asia. So we’re going to stay there.
President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.
For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense magnitude. A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest. This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace -- in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace. It would bring more war.
For these reasons I rejected the recommendation I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battle front in order to end the war on many fronts. I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts. In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, on a number of other occasions, I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.
We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year. We have proposed to cease fire under international supervision. We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force.
And the Saigon government has pledged to accept the result of the election.
We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we’re willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable, except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future.
At the Paris peace conference Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings. Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the government of South Vietnam as we leave.
We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized in January that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum.
That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations, I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.
Tonight, I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace, initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed.
I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace. Soon after my election, through an individual who was directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement.
Hanoi’s replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations. Since the Soviet union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of Stare Rogers, my assistant for national security affairs, Dr. Kissinger; Ambassador Lodge and I personally have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started.
In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam.
None of these initiatives have to date produced results. In mid-July I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks.
I spoke directly in this office, where I’m now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh.
I did this outside the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end.
“Dear Mr. President:
“I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one, least of all the people of Vietnam. The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture both sides turned their face towards peace rather than toward conflict and war."
I received Ho Chi Minh’s reply on Aug. 30, three days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative. The full text of both letters is being released to the press.
In addition to the public meetings that I’ve referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam’s chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions.
And we have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communications which may still prove to be productive.
But the effect of all the public, private and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago, and since this Administration came into office on Jan. 20, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.
Well, now, who’s at fault? It’s becoming clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government. The obstacle is the other side’s absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace.
And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.
There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi ’s deciding to negotiate -- to negotiate seriously.
I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth -- the bad news as well as the good news -- where the lives of our young men are involved.
Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front. At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiations. I therefore put into effect another plan to bring peace -- a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.
It is in line with the major shift in U. S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25.
Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine -- a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.
We Americans are a do-it-yourself people -- we’re an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy.
In Korea, and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the armament and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggressions.
Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen.
He said: “When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, United States policy should be to help them fight the war, but not to fight the war for them.”
Well in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles of guidelines for future American policy toward Asia .
First, the United States will deep all of its treaty commitments.
Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.
I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command, in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.
Thank you.